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ABSTRACT
This paper examines how both rhetoric about custom and practices
drawing on elements of deep-rooted political culture remain
relevant in post-colonial Tanzania. This is the case despite the
Tanzanian government’s aggressively modernising stance and the
erasure of colonial-era ‘traditional’ chiefs after independence. The
paper identifies three patterns. Firstly, witchcraft cleansing
remains a rare flashpoint over which rural people are willing to
defy officials, amid legislation that has barely moved on from the
colonial period. Secondly, for defenders of certain practices,
describing them as customary is a way to try to place them
beyond criticism, while for officials it becomes a way to wash their
hands of the attendant problems. Lastly, a performative political
practice can be discerned in the interactions between rural
populations, officials and development experts that resonate with
descriptions of pre-colonial political encounters. By looking for
local legitimacy in interactions with so-called elders, development
experts have become arbiters of (pseudo-)traditional authority
despite their modernising identity. These observations show that
discourses about and practices drawing on the customary
have become deeply imbricated with the political practices of the
rural state.
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This paper is concerned with the role of customary authority in rural Tanzania, and par-
ticularly in the southern regions of Lindi and Mtwara. For discussions of ‘customary auth-
ority’ since independence, Tanzania presents a challenge. For the colonial period, Iliffe’s
treatment of ‘Indirect Rule’ in this territory is a classic on the topic of ‘invention of
tribes’ that recognises the diversity of outcomes while casting it as fairly benign.1 For
the post-colonial period, though, ‘customary authority’ has garnered very little attention
here. The Nyerere government abolished chiefship shortly after independence and posi-
tioned itself as one of the most assertively modernising and bureaucratic on the continent.2
In keeping with the observations by Verweijen and van Bockhaven in the introduction to
this special issue on the tendency to identify ‘customary authority’ with chiefship, the
erasure of chiefship also reduced attention to customary authority. Meanwhile, ethnic
mobilisation, elsewhere a useful lens for tracing loyalties with roots in custom, is conspic-
uous mostly by its absence. The literature on political relations since independence has
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consequently focused on the authoritarianism of the developmentalist state and its rural
emissaries.3 The question arises, then, of where, if anywhere, to locate ‘customary auth-
ority’ in post-colonial Tanzania.
This question draws the observer into the sprawling debate on the roles of ‘custom’ or
‘tradition’ in African politics since the colonial period. The definitions and characteris-
ations of customary authority, and more widely of custom or tradition, at play here
vary greatly. So do those of their antinomies, described as modern or formal institutions
or simply the state. This paper takes leads from the introduction to this special issue, which
makes a number of helpful observations. Firstly, Verweijen and van Bockhaven make clear
that there is no point in trying to pick the practices of authority in African states and
societies neatly apart into ‘customary’ elements on one hand and ‘formal’ or ‘modern’
ones on the other. In keeping with Spear’s now-classic review of the topic, what passes
as political tradition in Africa now is neither primordial nor constructed, but unstably
drawn together from sources that vary from long-standing and deep-rooted beliefs or dis-
positions to context-bound, situational improvisations.4
Accordingly, the discussion below finds practices rooted in local political tradition at
work in self-consciously modern development interventions, without acknowledgment
of their presence and notwithstanding the absence of recognised customary authority
figures. Conversely, sometimes notions of long-standing tradition are invoked to bolster
stances that are very much contemporary. This paper, then, accepts that there are
popular political imaginaries at work in Tanzania today that are not instigated by
formal authorities and draw on long-standing, arguably pre-colonial dispositions and
claims. Further, these imaginaries can underpin forms of authority not derived from
state endorsement. But rather than trying to extricate these claims, dispositions and auth-
ority positions from their contemporary environment, the aim is to trace their imbrication.
Secondly, in keeping with the simultaneously inherited and constructed, improvised
and place-specific character of political authority in post-colonial settings, there is no gen-
eralisable account of how colonial rule affected customary authority. Nor is there one
correct description of the interrelation between customary and formal authority in
post-colonial Africa. Balances differ over place and time, as well as with observers’
definitions and points of view. As will become clear below, the area examined here pre-
sents a deviation even from the rough likelihoods that the special issue’s editors identify
in that the lack of centralised authority here did not provoke attempts by colonial
officials to create one. As a corollary of the salience of context-bound variation and con-
stant improvisation, the observations below clearly chime with Verweijen and van Boc-
khaven’s emphasis on the state as process as well as structure. In the interactions
between rural officials, experts and villagers described below, it appears as constantly
being put together.
Thirdly, Verweijen and van Bockhaven emphasise that elements of customary authority
are not found only in connection with chiefship, to which colonial rulers often sought to
confine it. They highlight that besides the discursive and socioeconomic sources of power
that recent literature has emphasised in connection with chiefship, customary authority
has ritual, symbolic, and arguably cognitive dimensions that dynastic-political definitions
centred on chiefship marginalise.5 This observation is very important for the case dis-
cussed here. As elsewhere in Tanzania and more widely in Swahili-speaking regions,
the people I observed here had a developed vocabulary for phenomena to do with
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customary authority. Typically, they used mila to refer to customs inspired by Islam, and
jadi to refer to customary practices not derived from any religion. They also knew utama-
duni, roughly ‘culture’, as the purview of one of the officers of local governments (the afisa
utamaduni), and its evil twin, imani potofu or ushirikina, roughly ‘superstition’.6 Never-
theless, while references to jadi and its kindred formed part of a widespread rhetoric, this
rhetoric was not primarily about politics and the state. It was part of conversations that
could be about the state, but also about family relations, religious life, or broad ideas
about how individuals and communities related to social change.
Conversely, in relations between state envoys and villagers, customary practices were at
work that were not explicitly identified as jadi. In other words, jadi and its kindred oper-
ated both as a means and object of rhetoric, and as deep-rooted practices, structures or
habits of thought not explicated as jadi. Some of the arguably most powerful aspects of
custom are ones not explicated as such, for instance, the performative practices outlined
below. The paper by Komunji and Buescher in this issue suggests that this observation
applies more widely than Lindi and Mtwara, and it could be very revealing to map
these parallels.
In this paper, though, my interest is rather in exploring how the operations of such
practices can help bridge the gaps between different modus operandi of the Tanzanian
state: its ‘authoritarian-technocratic-modernising’ modus on one hand and its ‘populist-
clientelist’ one on the other. Paying attention to rhetoric about and uses of customary
practice helps understand how the Tanzanian state continues beyond the defeat of the
modernist agenda that initially underpinned its assertiveness, and how it balances its
‘modernist tradition’ of developmental authoritarianism with the accommodating
practices necessitated by its straitened means and the turn towards consultative routines
in development.7
‘Custom’ and the developmentalist state
To set this aim in context: the diverse appearances of customary authority in post-colonial
African states are linked to another sprawling debate, this one on the functioning,
dynamics and character of post-colonial states. Tanzania is particularly relevant to one
aspect of this debate: the tension between the perceived strength of African states, if posi-
tioned as authoritarian, and their perceived weakness if considering their lack of resources
and dependence on clientelism.8 Consider, for example, the conflicting conclusions drawn
by Bayart on one hand and Chabal and Daloz on the other, based on the observation of
similar processes in countries with similar post-colonial trajectories.9 Bayart characterises
African states as strong enough to face down discontented urban masses and exploit rural
producers. Chabal and Daloz describe it as overrun and overgrown by personal networks
and barely there. Similarly, Herbst and Englebert have highlighted the difficulty of state-
making in Africa and the resulting limits on the powers of its states, while a recent political
economy of Tanzania describes its state as very stable and firmly in the grip of an
entrenched metropolitan elite, even though Tanzania clearly shares in the structural pro-
blems identified by Herbst and Englebert.10
In part, this contrast arises from differences in definitions, terms and case studies. But it
also reflects the complexities of understanding ‘state survival’ in post-colonial Africa, as
states described by a variety of metrics as failing or barely there continue to make
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themselves felt strongly, if intermittently, in the lives of their citizens. Tanzania makes a
useful site for trying to explain how these different descriptions make sense, partly
because its stability is often taken as a given, in contrast to many other African states.
Factors cited to explain it include first president Nyerere’s exceptional political skills,
the absence of large ethnic factions, the political quiescence of little-stratified peasant
societies, and the state’s ability to maintain the flow of aid by exploiting geopolitical com-
petition.11 But political stability in Tanzania is also constantly seen as under threat, given
the ethnic and religious diversity of its population and the sheer grinding poverty, and thus
practical limitations, of the state itself.12 There has to be a process, then, that maintains the
stability, and customary political and social practice forms part of it.
Put differently: tracing uses of the notion of custom, and elements of current politi-
cal practice that can plausibly be described as customary, helps understand how non-
elite Tanzanians contribute to the perceived stability of the Tanzanian state, rather than
merely accepting it. Unlike the notion of ‘development’ and its kindred, which stand at
the centre of official legitimating discourse, ‘custom’ cannot be monopolised by factions
close to the state (or, likewise, business). It therefore directs attention to the involve-
ment of ordinary citizens in the political process, and to the effort involved in
keeping these apparently quiescent constituencies on the state’s side. In this way, it pro-
vides space for the insights, provided for example by Giblin, on villagers’ active efforts
to manage their relations with state power. This step, in turn, enables an understanding
of Tanzanian politics that relies less on implicit assumptions about the apparent
gullibility and quiescence of rural populations than is common in much of the
literature.13
Thus the view taken here is that if people seeking control over others, or over resources,
invoke ‘custom’ at certain moments, this highlights both the strength of the state and its
limits. It shows the state’s strength because state agents set many of the terms for the invo-
cation of custom, and at times, use the designation ‘customary’ to delegitimate certain
practices as ‘backward’.14 It shows its limits in that agents of the state, as well as ordinary
citizens seeking to negotiate with it, find it necessary to draw on ‘custom’, even though this
notion has no place in official understandings of the Tanzanian state. Moreover, at times
state representatives designate certain realms of human activity as ‘customary’, thus
beyond their remit, rather than try and fail to control them.15 In this case, the invocation
of ‘custom’ becomes a way for state agencies to limit their obligations and retreat from
intractable problems.
When tracing these invocations of the customary, the rural state appears less as a stable
set of institutions dominating a quiescent rural population, and more as a process, driven
by the constant effort of state representatives to project power and reproduce the political
order.16 This processual nature of the state, in turn, suggests an explanation for the
difficulty of deciding whether the Tanzanian state is authoritarian, thus strong, or weak,
in consequence of its shattering poverty. As rural officials muddle through, their
degrees of influence and legitimacy are constantly in flux; the power of different actors
waxes and wanes in ways that static descriptions strain to accommodate. Rather than
custom surviving from the stateless past, the spaces of the customary in public debate
and the practice of governance are co-constituted by the state and by place-specific
social practice.17 Arguably, this view on the ‘customary’ also softens the contrast
between Tanzania and those countries where chiefdom remains part of the political
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structure, such as Congo, the subject of several other papers in this collection. The con-
clusion returns to this observation.
The region discussed here
My empirical observations derive predominantly from the Southeast of Tanzania, the
regions of Lindi and Mtwara. Different parts of Tanzania exhibited significant variation
in the character of relations between citizens and state authorities, and officials in this
part of the country were at times more and at times less intrusive than they were elsewhere.
These distinctions arise from the legacy of variations in the organisation of government
during the colonial period, in connectivity between different regions and the political
centres, and from the ramifications of successive policy turns for these varying struc-
tures.18 Thus my observations are bound to be idiosyncratic, shaped by the peculiarities
of this region. It is all the more striking, then, that they chime at times with observations
from historically, geographically and culturally quite different places.
The distinctiveness of the southeast lies particularly in its decentralised, notoriously
(among colonial officials) ineffective indirect rule regime. Early British administrators
here took the region’s ethnic diversity as a sign that German rule had destroyed ‘tribal’
organisation. But rather than seek to reconstruct it as prelude to imposing paramount
chiefs, they appointed unusually small-scale ‘native authorities’; essentially village
headmen grouped into regional councils.19 Their ineffectiveness fed into the reputation
of the area for ‘backwardness’, well established by the time of independence. In the
1970s, the perceived need to act decisively against this lack of progress, and the tenuous-
ness of patronage links to the capital, fed into an aggressive villagisation campaign.20
Yet here as elsewhere, villagisation quickly faltered. Its nation-wide economic repercus-
sions were reinforced by the impossibility of moving the cashew trees that were the South-
east’s main cash crop.21 Subsequently, the donor agencies chosen for this region
emphasised consultation and ‘basic needs’, rather than technocratic, approaches to devel-
opment.22 Parts of this paper examine the ensuing forms of accommodation between state
representatives and those of communities targeted by development, tracing spaces for pol-
itical practices informed by custom. Some of these forms are very place-specific, but others
work on a national, or perhaps even ‘Swahili-phone’, regional level, particularly those
involving explicit claims about Tanzanian or ‘African’ culture.23 Among these, claims
about and practical attempts to control uchawi, witchcraft, form one of the widespread
and pervasive objects of disagreement and accommodation, and one of interest not
only to development specialists, but to all officials concerned with order.
Customary challenges to state authority? Healing, witch finding and
the law
Uneasy negotiations surround forms of custom focused on healing and, especially, coun-
tering witchcraft, which are both impossible to discount and continually resistant to incor-
poration into the state’s legal system.24 Praise for traditional medicine as a popular
resource and its condemnation as superstition lie close together in official discourse,
leaving the broad problem of addressing illness and misfortune, potentially a source of
substantial authority, in an ambiguous position.25 Like biomedicine, traditional healing
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is regulated in Tanzania, and both the biomedical establishment and the state seek to
harness it to medical aims.26 While such attempts offer healers a modicum of status,
they also make them vulnerable to scrutiny, regulation and potentially prosecution. Con-
comitantly, healers typically keep a low profile; they advertise their practice, often recom-
mending contact by phone, but do not draw excessive attention to themselves.
Witchcraft eradication, though, is a different matter. As elsewhere in British Africa, law
in colonial Tanganyika Territory did not recognise witchcraft as a punishable offense, but
punished witchcraft accusations. A version of these rules remains in place.27 Conse-
quently, the urgent problem, to many people’s minds, of addressing witchcraft remains
removed from the purview of the state. In the late colonial and early independence
period, some witchcraft eradicators acquired fame and maintained cooperative relations
with representatives of the independence movement and the state.28 Today, too, as
Maia Green has shown, there are healers who position their witchcraft cleansing as a
social service and a contribution to societal progress; in a way, an effort towards the ubi-
quitous aim of development.29
Yet witch finding and cleansing also constitute the clearest example of ‘insurgent
knowledge’ in the history of colonial and post-colonial Tanzania. In colonial Tanganyika,
witch finding movements never quite caused the same degree of concern among admin-
istrators as Karen Fields has demonstrated for Central Africa.30 Nevertheless, official
unease about them ran deep, as the ‘witchcraft ordinance’ signals with its penalties for
claims to witchcraft cleansing abilities as well as witchcraft accusations. In the post-colo-
nial period, witchcraft cleansing or prosecution have been a rare cause over which rural
people in Lindi and Mtwara have been willing to defy the state.
Thus for the 1990s, Stacey Langwick reports that villagers in Mtwara protested violently
against official attempts to curtail witch finding, while in Central Tanzania the killing of
suspected witches has been an intractable problem.31 In the early 2000s, I observed the
anxieties and negotiations around this practice when, on the heels of rising rates of
illness and death from HIV/AIDS, witch finding experienced a minor renaissance.32
Official responses varied. In one town, the village government refused to let witch
finders operate, but did not prosecute anyone. In another village, elders invited a witch
finder, and after he had done his job, left the village executive officer to be prosecuted
for having facilitated his activities, which was construed as a public order offence.33
One particular witch finder created an ephemeral youth movement, observed mistrustfully
by elders and authorities alike, that clashed with the young Muslim reformists who were
active at the same time. Like good modernists, the Muslim reformists agreed with the
administration that witchcraft fears were mere superstition.34 Evidently, officials picked
their battles where witch finders were concerned; they improvised and sought paths of
least resistance.
The most striking failure I have encountered to prosecute a witch finder who had been
involved in unambiguously illegal activity concerned the murder of a man who was
accused of doubling as a human-eating lion, on the accusation of a well-reputed
healer.35 These events occurred around 2003 in Mbekenyera, a remote town in Lindi
region. After several people had been killed by the lion, the healer, a woman who lived
in a remote location reachable only by foot, called a public meeting. During the
meeting, young men interpreted her ambiguous gestures to incriminate a man who was
anyway considered an outsider. He tried to hide, but they hunted him down and beat
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him to death. According to the reports that reached me, local authorities paid some of the
young men to bury the victim, who had no local relatives, in a shallow grave, the vanda-
lisation of which by scavenging animals was taken as further evidence of his guilt. But
neither the healer nor the members of the lynch mob faced charges.
Evidently, the healer in question held enough authority to immunise herself from pro-
secution. Despite her role in these violent events, she was typically described along the
lines of the pacific witchcraft-shaving expert that Green observed in the 1990s in a neigh-
bouring region: remote from towns and their modern ways, supported by ancient powers
closely tied to nature, a purifying counter-force to witches that normally calmed conflicts,
rather than raising them.36 Her safety from prosecution highlights paradoxical features of
her position. She was supposed to hold moral authority precisely because she did not inter-
act with this-worldly, modernising pursuits of power.37 In this sense, her influence was
self-limiting from the point of view of officials. While her reputation depended on her
being seen as distant from contemporary ways, she was not likely to challenge officials,
the quintessential purveyors of state-endorsed modernity, directly. Nevertheless, the
failure to prosecute her suggests that officials assessed her influence as strong enough to
mobilise rural people in her protection if need be.
Witch finding, and healing more broadly, here constitute an unstable realm whose
relationship with the state oscillates between regulation, endorsement, toleration,
repression and ostracism. However variable the relationships, though, the practitioners
of witch finding always have to be ready to negotiate with state representatives.38 Thus
while the healer’s authority is clearly rooted in a realm of claims and practices that
predate the state, it is inextricably intertwined with political practices and discourses
that cannot pass as customary. The politics around witch finding, then, make clear
that Tanzania’s self-consciously modern, formal and bureaucratic institutions do not
have a monopoly on structuring politics and governance in the country, notwithstand-
ing the government’s decisive move against the customary authorities inherited from
colonial rule. But the wielders of authority drawn from customary practices still have
to reckon with officialdom, even if by evasion. Conversely, state representatives, too,
need to pick their battles with figures like this healer. Their failure to prosecute her
forms part of a broader pattern, whereby the designation of certain issues as matters
of ‘custom’ or, more broadly, ‘culture’ allows officials to corral them into a space
beyond their own responsibilities.
Invocation of ‘custom’ as a means to abdicate responsibility: families,
domesticity and the politics of culture
While the authority derived from witch finding hovers uneasily round the edges of the
rural state, custom and culture are routinely invoked in today’s Tanzania to assert and
justify authority structures in families and the domestic sphere. The kind of practices
described as cultural and the values ascribed to them on these occasions vary enormously.
Thus an aversion to violence and conflict is often described as a trait of Tanzanian political
culture, while homoerotic sexual practices are described as against ‘African’ culture, imply-
ing that ‘African’ culture prescribes heterosexuality. More specific arrangements pertain-
ing to marriage, childbirth and domesticity, to things such as birth spacing or
commensality, may be associated with specific ethnic groups.39 For example, defenders
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of girls’ initiation in Lindi and Mtwara position it as a part of Mwera or Makonde culture,
thus part of a heritage deserving protection.40
This kind of claim draws on several elements of official political rhetoric. The ‘village
museum’ outside Dar es Salaam, with its display of huts and implements ‘typical’ of dis-
crete ethnic groups, is a concrete expression of the official stance that all ethnic identities
form part of a national cultural heritage, and as such deserve protection. In this line of
reasoning, the designation of ethnic identity as a question of culture serves to de-politicise
it: ethnic traditions can live on in the realm of culture, while the political sphere can
remain designated as thoroughly modern.41 Thus a 1998 ‘holiday of the Makua and
Yao’ at the village museum featured the heir to one of the long-standing big-man titles
among Yao-speakers, Mataka, seated at a table while women passed him on their knees,
ululating. What would once have been a demonstration of political power was reposi-
tioned as spectacle. The utility of this approach for a state as multi-ethnic as Tanzania
is obvious. Nevertheless, it also has the effect of moving ‘ethnic’ culture beyond debate:
if a practice is designated as part of a group’s culture, then the default position is that it
is protected alongside all others. Hence the invocation of culture in defence of girls’
initiation.
Indirectly, though, this way of reasoning confers its own kind of political power on the
designation of certain practices as part of, or inimical to, particular ‘cultures’. This is most
immediately evident in the way the condemnation of certain sexual preferences or prac-
tices as ‘un-African’ has served the socially-conservative agendas of religious activists in
Tanzania.42 Similarly, various versions of ‘culture’ (African, Tanzanian, ethnic or reli-
gious) are invoked with striking frequency to justify patriarchal domestic relationships.
‘Here in Africa, we believe in culture’, is a sentence that I have heard uttered in defence
of asymmetrical gender roles, and there are countless permutations of this trope. Thus
it is ‘tradition’ for wives to take off their husband’s shoes when they arrive home, to
bring them water, to provide them with the choicest piece of meat at dinner, to not contra-
dict them, and so on.43 Clearly, these are schematic assertions that only very partially
reflect the practice and power structure in individual households. But they are often
invoked to counter official developmentalist rhetoric on gender equality and women’s
rights.44
That said, challenges to such assertions of gendered entitlement protected by custom
are possible. They involve drawing on a different register of public discourse on culture;
one that is aligned with its modernising, developmentalist strand. For ‘custom’ can be dis-
carded if it is designated as Imani potofu or ushirikina, roughly, superstition or false
belief.45 It is hardly coincidental that while men often wield the rhetoric of tradition,
these terms critical of tradition are heard particularly from women. They occur for
instance in connection with opposition to female circumcision, and Hodgson shows
their role in connection with choice of marital partner.46 Obviously, there is no consistent
standard by which to sort protected ‘custom’ from obsolete ‘superstition’. The dividing is
drawn in the constant interaction of policy agendas, official rhetoric, popular claims and
private negotiations.
Ultimately, the effects of this mock-antiquarian manner of depoliticising and quaran-
tining particular social practices and claims by declaring them cultural are ambiguous. It
fences off questions that are clearly of enormous relevance to social policy and to the kind
of social change often glossed as development, such as the negotiation of reproductive
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choices. It corrals them into a realm that formal, modernising state authority washes its
hands of. Yet while this move threatens to deprive the losers of these ‘ringfenced’ cultural
practices of recourse, challenges to this kind of rhetoric remain possible by appealing to
the state’s modern identity. The language in which they have to be put, though, is of an
assertively progressive kind, the kind that dismisses beliefs as superstitions. Such moder-
nising rhetoric has begun to sound almost old-fashioned; it is part of what could be called
the state’s ‘modern tradition’.47 The ambiguous role of government, either endorsing or
censuring presumed custom, indicates a process of mutual accommodation between
defenders of custom and purveyors of modernity. Another form of accommodation
is evident in public political performances, where developmental rhetoric becomes
intertwined with unnamed customary practices so as to help rural officialdom be seen
to be in charge.
Bureaucratic performance and the limits of quiescence
In tracing ways of exerting authority that draw on custom without saying so, this paper
proceeds from the scepticism towards the assumptions of rural political quiescence
stated in the introduction.48 This scepticism is based on the observation of villagers’ per-
ceptive conversations about and strategic interactions with state representatives, as well as
reports of rural unrest from newspapers and secondary literature.49 They indicate that,
while rural officials can rely on material support from the centre if rural discontent
becomes an emergency, such emergencies are expensive and undesirable for a peripheral
state that remains, in spite of the declared rural focus of official development policy, pathe-
tically under-resourced.50 Moreover, the ‘buying of consent’ through patronage is not a
straightforward process, as patronage resources are limited, the processes whereby they
are procured complicated, and rural audiences are opinionated on their needs and prefer-
ences.51 The above discussion of their refusal to abstain from witchcraft cleansing and, in
the case of the murdered ‘lion-man’, witchcraft prosecution, has made this refractoriness
evident.
Under these circumstances, there is a genuine element of debate and persuasion to rural
politics in Lindi and Mtwara. Officials have to make their cases, and if they fail to do so,
risk quiet sabotage or at times open confrontation. Close up, the developmental authori-
tarianism of the rural state devolves, in this region, into encounters between officials and
their audiences in which both sides are under some obligation to demonstrate and affirm
their commitment to shared goals, and to produce contributions towards them.52 Typi-
cally, these take the form of access to NGO inputs that officials provide to villagers, and
of voluntary labour and other efforts that villagers provide to the interventions proposed
by these NGOs. Development NGOs, then, have effectively become intermediaries
between the state and its citizens.53
Some observers, most prominently Maia Green, have characterised this symbiosis
between development NGOs, the state and an aspiring Tanzanian middle class of devel-
opment facilitators as a mechanism that keeps rural people in their marginalised,
largely receptive, condescended-to place.54 But the occasions when experts descend on vil-
lages in all their splendour are part of a broader process in which, I think, provincial citi-
zens have somewhat more leverage than she allows. While provincial people need the
inputs and services that rural officials and experts control, the former also need the
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latter. In particular, while NGO representatives themselves can be characterised as inter-
mediaries between donors and target audiences, or donors and state authorities, they, in
their turn, need intermediaries from among the populations they target, and more
broadly, need cooperation in their projects from both local authorities and target
audiences.55
The result is a messy process of mutual cajoling and criticism. Take, for example, a 2003
attempt to get people to show up for an elephantiasis vaccination campaign in the rural
town of Rwangwa. It involved loudspeakers mounted on pick-up trucks incessantly cir-
cling the town, calling on people to join the queues in a tone that appeared borrowed
from radio advertising. They did not, however, directly address the rumours that were
making the rounds about fatal allergic reactions to the vaccine or its being derived from
pigs, thus haram for the town’s Muslim majority. The debates around witch finding in
Rwangwa further illustrate the mutual exasperation and mistrust. Supporters of the prac-
tice surmised that both Muslim reformists and the town government were involved in
zombie-keeping, because these otherwise inimical factions were united in their opposition
to witchcraft cleansing.56 There is, then, an element of public debate and performance to
rural governance: NGOs and local government deployed speakers, podiums, loudspeakers,
shiny cars and so on to make their case, but failed to sway public opinion.
In particular, mikutano,meetings, have become a mainstay of developmental interven-
tion: they are where vaccination campaigns, new buildings, visits from ‘on high’, agricul-
tural interventions, bore holes and so on are announced; a constant part of the consultative
processes around the kind of targeted input provision that rural NGOs have come to focus
on post-villagisation.57 Inevitably, they are highly choreographed, amounting to
public performances in which ranks, priorities and common purposes are confirmed.
Observing them, it is hard not to remember accounts of meetings by early colonial
district officers with some of the still fairly independent local power-brokers they
encountered.58
The choreographed, disciplined and decorous nature of these public performances
merits further examination. Inevitably, they were in Swahili, and speakers would draw
extensively on the language’s rich registers for the expression of respect and obligation.
This included both the inclusion of Arabicate, ‘coastal’ overtones, with greetings such as
shikamoo, ‘I hold your feet’, and forms of address such as waheshimiwa or waungwana
(the honourable or the patrician/freeborn). It also included call-and-response interactions
associated with mainland rather than coastal culture, often with the interjection ‘oye’ used
as an emphatic greeting:Warwangwa oye! ‘citizens of Rwangwa, I greet you!’ To which the
citizens addressed responded with a collective oye. Ululating, clapping and crowds
running with cars were further forms of popular participation that conferred status on
the people thus welcomed. The sense of protocol and decorum was highly developed
also in the attention given to the order of speakers, the invitations and honours extended
to ‘official guests’, and the way participants were seated.59
The content of these meetings revolved around the reaffirmation of shared goals
between the emissaries of the state, NGOs and citizens. The inevitable and often
lengthy invocations of maendeleo, which can mean both development and progress,
traced out common ground for the different parties.60 This explicit, ideological ‘develop-
mentalism’ is a widely recognised feature of the Tanzanian state. Yet the self-conscious
modernism is asserted through forms of conduct that resonate clearly with descriptions
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from the pre-colonial nineteenth century, of the way missionaries, travellers and early
representatives of the fledgling colonial state were received by the ‘big men’ who then
dominated the area.
These pre-colonial ‘big men’ were self-made leaders who attracted and controlled fol-
lowers through a mixture of patronage and violence, both enabled by their access to long-
distance trade. Their power lay in control over people and trade goods, and when they met
visitors, they brought their followers out in the open to demonstrate their clout.61 In this
way, the ability to literally mobilise villagers, to get them moving as they throng visitors in
the village square, mattered to the display of authority in the 1890s as in the 2000s. The
efflorescence of NGOs pursuing broad-based participation and ‘local ownership’ of
their projects has reinforced the similarity between present-day demonstrations of auth-
ority and their pre-colonial precedents, as such participation is best demonstrated
performatively.
It is perhaps worth emphasising that the failure of bureaucratic structures to monop-
olise the exertion of authority is not an exclusively ‘African’ thing. Performative, at
times carnivalesque aspects of politics (especially electoral politics) are clearly in evidence
also outside Africa.62 What is distinctive, though, is the juxtaposition of a sense of propri-
ety closely tied to the Swahili language and long-standing forms of public performance
with the in-origin modernising language of development. A similar invocation of disparate
sources of legitimacy is observable also in NGOs’ efforts to find ‘community representa-
tives’ to interact with.
NGOs and their traditional or anti-traditional community leaders
Since the rural state has struggled to recover from the over-stretch that accompanied vil-
lagisation, NGOs in Lindi and Mtwara have pursued models of ‘integrated programme
support’ that involve targeting interventions partly according to stated or assumed ‘com-
munity’ preferences.63 But who speaks for the ‘community’? The most routine answer to
this question again draws on widespread notions of custom or culture as patriarchal. Thus
one group who are routinely afforded a part in this interaction consists of those loosely
referred to as wazee, elders. They may be elders in a number of senses: party veterans,
mosque committee chairs, organic intellectuals, relatively successful cash croppers, even
rural traders.64 Almost inevitably, they are married men, and they are bound to be rela-
tively well-placed in social networks. The assumptions around who passes as an ‘elder’
in this context are arguably as unexamined now as they were when colonial officials
were out looking for ‘chiefs’.65 Really, what qualifies somebody as an elder or, more
widely, as a ‘community representative’ or ‘volunteer’ is their usefulness in the context
of a particular official intervention.
At the same time, though, the development NGOs active in Lindi and Mtwara routinely
insisted and prided themselves on the inclusion of constituencies cast as traditionally (cus-
tomarily?) marginalised; above all, women and youth. These groups, too, are therefore
routinely included among the ‘stakeholders’. This means that some ‘community interme-
diaries’ will be drawing on discourses of kinship and of hierarchies cast as traditional,
while others will derive their relevance precisely from representing constituencies of
whom it is assumed that they were ‘traditionally’ ignored.66 Either way, the actual social
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relations that make a person’s claim to either kind of status plausible are bound to be
personalised and idiosyncratic.
Clearly, then, this kind of intermediary status is acquired in a process of constant con-
struction and reconstruction of social relationships, in keeping with so many observations
on the nature of ‘customary’ authority in colonial and post-colonial Africa.67 Both appeals
to ‘custom’ and tradition and appeals to progress, development and modernity can be used
to claim such authority. Perhaps, the aggressive way in which the early post-colonial state
moved against chiefly authority is one of the reasons why developmentalist ideology has
come to take up so much space: the appeal to development had to do work that elsewhere
was taken on partly by the notion of custom. This perspective offers an alternative to
accounts of villagisation’s developmental authoritarianism that place the global intellec-
tual and political currents of ‘high modernism’ as the prime mover.68 Rather than mod-
ernist expectations ‘running away’ with Tanzanian officials, from this point of view
their aggressive invocation of modern aims and methods was partly the function of a
lack of alternatives; their inability to fall back on invocations of customary authority as
part of the structure of governance.
Conclusion
It is evident from the above that despite the abolition of ‘formal’ customary authorities in
post-colonial Tanzania, ‘the customary’ remains a productive category of political dis-
course, in ways that are very much concerned with authority. But perhaps the most reveal-
ing part of the preceding sentence is the bracketing of ‘formal’ with ‘customary’. That it is
necessary to distinguish between formally-constituted customary authority and popular,
informal versions indicates that the notions of customary authority at stake here have
themselves long been drawn into the orbit of formal state power, notwithstanding the
fact that customary authority was (and remains) supposed to be alien to formally consti-
tuted, bureaucratic, modern state power.
In fact, this distinction between customary and formal realms is highly unstable. As we
have seen, there are development NGOs, quintessential harbingers of modernity by their
self-definition and in the eyes of their target populations, who consult with and thereby
endorse so-called traditional elders. Conversely, attempts to challenge practices that
their defenders seek to protect by terming them customary have to call on notions of mod-
ernity that have themselves become elusive. Appeals to development continue to evoke an
automatism of progress and supposedly-unchallengeable forms of rationality that have
turned out to be mirages; rather than describing facts they function as part of a ‘discursive
tradition’ of modernisation.
By contrast, when it comes to the place of customary forms of authority in popular, dis-
sident politics, remarkably little appears to have changed since the colonial period, at least
when considering notions of witchcraft. Now as then, the phenomenon of witchcraft is
always a potential and often an actual embarrassment to state power. Open engagement
with it is impossible while official authority refuses to countenance the reality of witchcraft
to the vast majority of its citizens. Instead, officials oscillate between dismissing concerns
over witchcraft, trying to ‘translate’ it into categories they can accommodate, opposing
witchcraft cleansing, tolerating it or turning a blind eye. For people to whom witchcraft
is an indisputable problem, the urgency of dealing with it can provide a rare cause for
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defiance of state authorities. In this sense, witchcraft experts can acquire an (albeit very
context-bound) authority that clearly draws on long-standing custom and stands apart
from, at times even counters, state authority.
The significance of witchcraft arguably extends beyond its ability to crystallise dissent
and defiance. Witchcraft discourses have been shown to be both deeply moral and often
concerned with fairness in the distribution of scarce goods, and in this way, they provide
signposts to a wider discursive field.69 They signal the vitality of political imaginations that
occur also in many forms that have not been discussed here, from the politics of Christian
and Muslim congregations to the political commentary in newspaper poetry, journalistic
commentary, popular music and rumour. In conjunction with the careful strategising by
rural officials, seeking to deploy their connections with NGOs as well as with the political
centre in the carefully choreographed performances outlined above, these imaginations are
a reminder that the absence of more visible and vigorous political dissent in Tanzania is
not simply a non-event. Rather, the reproduction of peripheral state authority in Tanzania
takes constant work.
These performances, moreover, highlight the importance of looking beyond rhetoric
and explicit, verbalised discourse when tracing the spaces of the customary. The distinctive
way of doing things that I encountered, strongly reminiscent of pre-colonial sources,
points towards continuities in the form and practice of politics. One likely implication
is that then as now, language, verbal statements, cannot be taken at face value; they are
one element in a much richer spectacle. Statements that appear disingenuous to an obser-
ver expecting pragmatic, technical reasoning may be less so if speaker and audience know
they are participating in a kind of theatre.
In this manner, the recurrent reliance on performance points to the influence of a long-
standing political culture that explains aspects of political practice otherwise easily dis-
missed as post-colonial dysfunction, such as apparently empty rhetoric. Yet the continu-
ities should not be over-emphasised, either: the same or similar sense of decorum and
spectacle clearly ends up doing very different work whether deployed in a slave-trading
big man’s diplomatic mission or in the interactions between development experts and
their target populations. As the example shows, present uses of customary practice are
not by default worse than the past.
The recurrence of performative elements nevertheless reflects the persistence of the
challenges confronting those seeking control over people. In part, the challenges arise
from this political culture, as when witchcraft discourse is deployed to express mistrust
towards the powerful. But they also arise from the practical difficulty of maintaining ter-
ritorial control, with the straitened means available to a state as impoverished as the Tan-
zanian. In this context, the public performances form a way of making maximum use of
those times when citizens are reachable for the representatives of the state, which matters
precisely because a lot of the time the state’s presence remains fairly ephemeral.
The salience of references to development on these occasions has in itself become part
of a post-colonial political tradition that has formed in Tanzania over the last half-century.
As a contributor to the effort to keep a struggling administration going, the search for
‘community representatives’ in contemporary development resembles indirect rule, high-
lighting the gap left by the erasure of the formal customary authorities that served similar
purposes in the colonial period. At the same time, the role of political performance in con-
nection with development makes clear that customary authority is not summed up in
JOURNAL OF EASTERN AFRICAN STUDIES 157
chiefship. It also shows the active involvement, rather than mere compliance, of villagers
in the reproduction of the rural state, and the instability of the distinction between
‘custom’ on one hand and ‘modernity’ on the other.
Notes
1. Iliffe, Modern History.
2. Coulson, Tanzania.
3. Scott, Seeing Like a State, chapter 7.
4. Spear, ‘Limits of Invention’.
5. They cite Spear, ‘Limits of Invention’, as emphasising discursive sources, and Boone, ‘Politi-
cal Topographies’, as emphasising socioeconomic ones.
6. For the longer antecedents of this terminology, see e.g. Velten, Sitten und Gebraeuche.
7. On the rise and ambiguous effects of consultation and ‘empowerment’ in the practice of
development, see Green, Development State.
8. E.g. Bayart, State in Africa, vs. Chabal and Daloz, Africa works; see Boone, Political Topogra-
phies, for the suggestion that political elites in African states may direct provincial adminis-
trators to project strong or weak stances depending on circumstance.
9. Bayart, State in Africa; Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works; on the commonalities among coastal
West African states, see Dunn, Cruise O’Brien, and Rathbone, Contemporary West African
States.
10. Herbst, State in Africa; Englebert, State Legitimacy; Lofchie, Political Economy.
11. Fouéré, ‘Hégémonie Competitive’; Coulson, Political Economy; Lofchie, Political Economy;
Michael Jennings, ‘Almost an Oxfam in Itself’.
12. Kaiser, ‘Structural Adjustment and the Fragile Nation’.
13. Giblin, History of the Excluded.
14. Hodgson, Problem of Culture.
15. See below, on references to jadi, ‘tradition’, and similar in Tanzanian public discourse.
16. For rural state as process in East Africa, see Haugerud, Culture of Politics.
17. For custom in the judicial system, see Dancer, Women, Land and Justice.
18. Liebenow, Political Development; Lal, African Socialism. For further detail, see Becker ‘Social
History’.
19. Mikindani, Lindi, and Kilwa ‘district books’, sections on ‘tribal organisation’. Tanzanian
National Archive, Dar es Salaam.
20. On the importance of regional factions in parliament for sheltering parts of Tanzania from
Villagization, see Raikes, ‘Rural Differentiation’.
21. Lal, African Socialism.
22. On the ‘partition’ of Tanzania into different donor countries’ spheres of influence, see Lal,
African Socialism.
23. As evident e.g. in the pages of the Dar es Salaam-based political weekly Raia Mwema.
For an example, see ‘Said’, ‘Mahakama ya Kadhi’, Raia Mwema,Dar es Salaam, February 4, 2015.
24. On witchcraft in contemporary Tanzania, see Moore and Saunders, Magical Interpretations;
on the history of witchcraft cleansing, Larsen, ‘Witchcraft Eradication Sequences’. On the
political tensions around eradication in colonial Africa, see Fields, Revival and Rebellion.
25. On ambiguous official reaction to traditional healing, see. Mattes ‘Blood of Jesus’.
26. Mattes, ‘Blood of Jesus’.
27. See Tanzania Government Printer, The Witchcraft Ordinance, Dar es Salaam, 2012 (one of
multiple editions).
28. Bin Ismail and Lienhardt, Swifa ya Nguvumali; Becker, Becoming Muslim, chapter 7.
29. Green, Development State; also Green, Christianity after Mission.
30. Fields, Revival and Rebellion
31. Langwick, ‘Devils and Development’; Saunders, ‘Save Our Skins’.
32. Becker, ‘The Virus and the Scriptures’.
158 F. BECKER
33. I reconstructed these events from numerous conversations, with notables and ordinary resi-
dents of the village concerned, Mingoyo, and the ex-executive officer under investigation.
34. I encountered this witch finder at work in the coastal village of Sudi, where elders stood by in
stony silence as their homes were searched for witchcraft paraphernalia.
35. I encountered at least three oral accounts of this event while working in Rwangwa town, Lindi
rural region, in 2003. I had asked about it originally because the story was being discussed by
American Peace Corps volunteers, one of whom had been stationed in the town of Mbeke-
nyera where the murder happened.
36. Green, Christianity after Mission.
37. This notion that spaces where spirits or similar ‘traditional’ forces can be contacted need to
be kept free from the trappings of modernity occurred also in other, similar contexts. For
example, I was told about a shrine dedicated to a lineage-founding ancestress that would
‘work’ only if you had no radio, phone or watch on your person. Similar tropes can also
be found in newspaper stories about encounters with spirits. For a kindred case, see
Naomi Pendle’s paper in this collection.
38. On healing and religion in contemporary Tanzania more broadly, see Hansjoerg Dilger’s
work, in particular Dilger et al., Medicine, Mobility and Power.
39. On the supposedly pacific nature of Tanzanian politics, see Becker ‘Remembering Nyerere’; on
the conflicts around homosexuality, Larsen, ‘Pleasures and Prohibitions’; on ethnically specific
customs, Tumbo-Masabo, Chelewa Chelewa; Wemba-Rashid ‘Culture in Southeastern Tanzania’.
40. Responses were often defensive when bringing up the topic of girls’ initiation, which is
unpopular also with Muslim reformers. Wanafundishwa adabu tu/’ they are only taught
respect’ is a much-heard claim.
41. See Bayart, Illusion of cultural identity. The approach has similarities with the way religious
diversity has been construed in post-colonial as private, distant from politics and subordinate
to the political obligation to support the nation. See Westerlund, Ujamaa na dini.
42. These processes have been better studied for Uganda, but they resonate strongly in Tanzania.
I encountered them for example in conversation with Nuruddin Hussein, leader of the Shad-
hiliyya in Tanzania until his death in ca. 2008.
43. Such representations of subservient domesticity are frequent in Muslim sermons, e.g. by
Hassan Nyundo, but do not need religious justification. They are a mainstay of conversations
about gender relations with men and women alike. E.g. Hassan Nyundo, Mambo matatu
wanawake watahadhari nayo, Recorded sermon, available at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=eZshy9SMaf0.
44. On the manifest concerns about the ramifications of gender-related progressivism, see again
Nyundo’s sermons, as well as Nassor Bachu’s online sermon Haki za mume na mke, online
sermon available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J-76Ng5zWwM; and Hodgson,
Problem of Culture.
45. See e.g. the ‘rapid funding envelope on HIV/AIDS’ and its policy documents on countering
AIDS-related stigma. Rapid Funding Envelope for AIDS in Tanzania (RFE), ‘2006–14
Awards Summary, rounds 0–4. Available at www.rapidfundingenvelope.org.
46. Hodgson, Problem of Culture.
47. For critiques of this kind of aggressive modernism, see Escobar, Encountering Development,
and Chakrabarty, Provincialising Europe.
48. For a recent example, see Lofchie, Political Economy.
49. In particular, newspaper reports on violent protests against cashew pricing in 2015/16, dis-
cussed in Becker, Politics of Poverty, chapters 7 and 8, and the reports on violence in defence
of witchcraft cleansing in the 1990s, reported in Langwick, ‘Devils and Development’.
50. On the poverty of the rural state, see Hyden, Beyond ujamaa; more recently, Becker, Politics
of Poverty.
51. For a case study where ‘buying of consent’ appears to have become fairly routine, see Smith, A
Culture of Corruption. For its limitations in Tanzania, see also Kelsall, ‘Arumeru tax revolt’
(who nevertheless predicts a resurgence of the practice in the Arumeru region); Coulson, Pol-
itical Economy.
JOURNAL OF EASTERN AFRICAN STUDIES 159
52. E.g. interviews concerning the communally-led building of a market hall in Kineng’ene
village near Lindi town. Interview with Azizi Ahmed Utali, Kineng’ene 14 August 2012;
with Saidi Selemani, Kineng’ene 15 August 2012.
53. A point explored also in Green, Development State.
54. Green, Development State.
55. On this process, see Green and Brown, ‘At the Service of Community Development’.
56. For more on this see Becker ‘Rural Islamism’.
57. Much of the content of the library kept by Rural Integrated Programme Suport (RIPS), the
leading internationally (more precisely, Finnish) funded NGO in Lindi and Mtwara in ca.
1995–2004, at its headquarters in Mtwara could be cited as evidence of this approach. E.g.
Mongula et al, ‘Village Study’.
58. E.g. Schmidt, Aus kolonialer Fruehzeit; Maples, ‘Masasi’; Stenzler, Deutsch-Ostafrika; Bezirk-
samtmann (District Officer) Zache, Lindi, ‘Report on Journey to the Rovuma’, 23 January
1900. Bundesarchiv, Berlin, R 1001/220, 14, on his meetings with Hatia and Mataka. This
kinship is noted also in Haugerud, The Culture of Politics.
59. For a colonial-era coastal parallel, see the official comments on a provincial commissioner’s
visit to the Shadhili school run in Kilwa Kisiwani by Hussein bin Mahmood in the 1930s.
Report on Shadhili school in Kilwa Kisiwani, Kilwa District Book, section ‘education’, Tan-
zania National Archives.
60. E.g. speeches of district commissioners documented on their websites; Anonymous, ‘Rapid
rural appraisal’ reports on Kilwa Kivinje, Lindi and Mingoyo. Rural Integrated Project
Support RIPS library.
61. Becker, ‘Traders, Big Men and Prophets’.
62. The recent electoral campaigns on Brexit in the UK and the presidency in the US are obvious
examples.
63. Brown and Prince, ‘Introduction’.
64. This variety became very palpable to me when seeking informants on various aspects of local
history in places like Lindi town, Mingoyo village and Rwangwa town. Often, local party
notables and Muslim notables were the same people, at least for the oldest generation that
had been active around independence. See Becker, Becoming Muslim, Chapter 7.
65. For a Tanzanian case study of this process, see Beidelman, Culture of Colonialism.
66. As is very clear in the 2004 RIPS report: Benedict Mongula, Peter Tumaini-Mungu Mosha,
and Dorosta R Kato, ‘A village study on changes at village level in Lindi and Mtwara Regions
during Phase III of the RIPS programme: a consultancy report submitted to RIPS, July, 2004’.
I thank Juhani Koponen for providing an electronic copy of this document.
Mongula et al., ‘Village Study’.
67. Chanock, Law, Custom and Social Order; Shadle, Girl Cases.
68. Scott, Seeing Like a State, Schneider, Government of Development; Lal, African Socialism.
69. E.g. Ferguson, Global Shadows, chapter 3.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful for research assistance provided by Zuhura Mohamed and for the hospitality of Hil-
degard and Rainer Vogt in Lindi.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Funding
I am grateful to St John’s Cambridge, the Arts and Humanities Research Council of the UK, the
Gerda Henkel Foundation, the European Union’s ‘Horizon 2020’ programme and Economic and
Social Research Council (ESRC) GCRF grant number ES/P008038/1 for financial support.
160 F. BECKER
Bibliography
Bayart, Jean-François. The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly. London: Hurst, 1993.
Bayart, Jean-François. The Illusion of Cultural Identity. London: Hurst, 1996.
Becker, Felicitas. Becoming Muslim in Mainland Tanzania. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Becker, Felicitas. “The Bureaucratic Performance of Development in Colonial and Post-Colonial
Tanzania.” Canadian Journal of Development Studies 35 (2014): 61–76.
Becker, Felicitas. The Politics of Poverty in Africa: Development and Policy Making in Tanzania.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
Becker, Felicitas. “Remembering Nyerere: Political Rhetoric and Dissent in Contemporary
Tanzania.” African Affairs 112 (2013): 238–261.
Becker, Felicitas. “Rural Islamism During the War on Terror: A Tanzanian Case Study.” African
Affairs 105 (2006): 583–603.
Becker, Felicitas. “A Social History of Southeast Tanzania, ca. 1880-1950.”Unpublished PhD thesis,
Cambridge University, 2002.
Becker, Felicitas. “Traders, Big Men and Prophets: Political Continuity and Crisis in the Maji Maji
Rebellion.” Journal of African History 45 (2004): 1–22.
Becker, Felicitas. “The Virus and the Scriptures: Muslims and AIDS in Tanzania.” Journal of
Religion in Africa 37 (2007): 16–40.
Beidelman, Thomas. The Culture of Colonialism: The Cultural Subjection of Ukaguru. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2012.
Berry, Sara. No Condition is Permanent: The Social Conditions of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993.
Bin Ismail, Hassan and Peter Lienhardt. The Medicine Man: Swifa ya Nguvumali. Oxford:
Clarendon, 1968.
Boone, Catherine. Political Topographies of the African State. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004.
Brown, H., and M. Green. “At the Service of Community Development: The Professionalization of
Volunteer Labour in Kenya and Tanzania.” African Studies Review 58 (2015): 63–84.
Brown, Hannah and Ruth Prince. “Introduction. Volunteer Labour: Pasts and Futures of Work,
Development and Citizenship in East Africa.” African Studies Review 58 (2015): 29–42.
Chabal, Patrick and Jean-Pascal Daloz. Africa Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.
Chakrabarty, Dipesh. Provincialising Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
Chanock, Martin. Law, Custom and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Cooper, Frederick. Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2005.
Coulson, Andrew. Tanzania: A Political Economy. Oxford: Clarendon, 1982.
Dancer, Helen. Women, Land and Justice in Tanzania. London: James Currey, 2014.
Dilger, Hansjoerg, Abdoulaye Kaye, and Stacey Langwick. Medicine, Mobility and Power in Global
Africa: Transnational Health and Healing. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012.
Dunn, John, Donald Cruise O’Brien, and Richard Rathbone. Contemporary West African States.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Englebert, Pierre. State Legitimacy and Development in Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000.
Englert, Birgit.Women’s Land Rights and Privatization in East Africa. London: James Currey, 2008.
Escobar, Arturo. Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Ferguson, James. Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order. Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2006.
Fields, Karen. Revival and Rebellion in Colonial Central Africa. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1987.
JOURNAL OF EASTERN AFRICAN STUDIES 161
Fouéré, Marie-Aude. “Une hégémonie competitive contre vents et marées: les élections générales de
2015 en Tanzanie et a Zanzibar.” Politique Africaine 140 (2015): 245–163.
Geissler, Wenzel and Ruth Prince. The Land is Dying: Contingency, Creativity and Conflict in
Western Kenya. Oxford: Berghahn, 2012.
Giblin, James. History of the Excluded: Making Family a Refuge from the State in Post-Colonial
Tanzania. London: James Currey, 2007.
Green, Maia. The Development State: Aid, Culture and Civil Society in Tanzania. London: James
Currey, 2014.
Green, Maia. Priests, Witches and Power: Popular Christianity after Mission in Southern Tanzania.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Green, Maia and Hannah Brown. “At the Service of Community Development: The
Professionalization of Volunteer Work in Kenya and Tanzania.” African Studies Review 58
(2015): 63–84.
Haugerud, Angelique. The Culture of Politics in Modern Kenya. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996.
Herbst, Jeffrey. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014.
Hodgson, Dorothy. Gender, Justice and the Problem of Culture: From Customary Law to Human
Rights in Tanzania. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017.
Hyden, Goran. Beyond ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981.
Iliffe, John. A Modern History of Tanganyika. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
Jennings, Michael. “Almost an Oxfam in Itself: Oxfam, ujamaa and Development in Tanzania.”
African Affairs 101 (2002): 509–530.
Kaiser, Paul. “Structural Adjustment and the Fragile Nation: The Demise of Social Unity in
Tanzania.” Journal of Modern African Studies 34 (1996): 227–237.
Kelsall, Timothy. “Governance, Local Politics and Districtization in Tanzania: The 1998 Arumeru
Tax Revolt.” African Affairs 99 (2000): 533–551.
Kelsall, Timothy. “Shop Windows and Smoke-Filled Rooms: Governance and the Re-Politicization
of Tanzania.” Journal of Modern African Studies 40 (2002): 597–619.
King, Noel Q, Klaus Fiedler, and Gavin White. Robin Lamburn: From a Missionary’s Notebook. The
Yao of Tunduru and Other Essays. Saarbruecken: Breitenbach, 1991.
Lal, Priya. African Socialism in Post-Colonial Tanzania: Between the Village and the World.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Langwick, Stacey, “Devils and Development.” Unpublished PhD thesis, University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill, ca. 2003.
Larsen, Kjersti. “Pleasure and Prohibitions: Reflections on Gender, Knowledge and Sexuality in
Zanzibar Town.” In Gendered Lives in the Western Indian Ocean, edited by Erin Stiles and
Katrina Daly Thompson, 209–241. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2015.
Larsen, Lorne. “Witchcraft Eradication Sequences among the People of the Mahenge (Ulanga)
District, Tanzania.” Working paper, University of Dar es Salaam, 1975.
Liebenow, Gus. Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania: The Case of the Makonde.
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
Lofchie, Michael. The Political Economy of Tanzania: Decline and Recovery. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014.
Lonsdale, John and Bruce Berman. Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa. London: James
Currey, 1992.
Maples, Chauncy. “Masasi and the Rovuma District in East Africa.” Proceedings of the Royal
Geographic Society 2 (1880): 338–353.
Mattes, Dominik. “The Blood of Jesus and CD4 Counts: Dreaming, Developing and Navigating
Options for Treating HIV/AIDS in Tanzania.” In Religion and AIDS Treatment in Africa:
Saving Souls Prolonging Lives, edited by Rijk van Dijk, Marian Burchardt, Hansjoerg Dilger,
and Tera Rasing, 169–195. London: Ashgate, 2014.
162 F. BECKER
Moore, Henrietta, and Todd Saunders, eds. Magical Interpretations, Material Realities: Modernity
and the Occult in Post-Colonial Africa. London: Routledge, 2001.
Perham, Margery. East African Journey: Kenya and Tanganyika, 1929-30. London: Faber and Faber,
1976.
Raikes, Philipp. “Rural Differentiation and Class Formation in Tanzania.” Journal of Peasant
Studies 5 (1978): 285–325.
Ranger, Terence. “The Invention of Tradition Revisited.” In Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth-
Century Africa, edited by Terence Ranger, and Olufemi Vaughan, 62–111. London: Macmillan,
1993.
Ranger, Terence. “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa.” In The Invention of Tradition
(New Edition), edited by Eric Hobsbawm, and Terence Ranger, 211–262. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Saunders, Todd. “Save our Skins: Structural Adjustment, Morality and the Occult in Tanzania.” In
Magical Interpretations, Material Realities: Modernity and the Occult in Post-Colonial Africa,
edited by Henrietta Moore, and Todd Saunders, 160–183. London: Routledge, 2001.
Schmidt, Rochus. Aus kolonialer Fruehzeit. Berlin: Safari Verlag, 1922.
Schneider, Leander. Government of Development: Peasants and Politics in Post-Colonial Tanzania.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014.
Scott, James. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have
Failed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998.
Shadle, Brett. Girl Cases: Marriage and Colonialism in Gusiiland, Kenya, ca. 1890-1970.
Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2006.
Smith, Daniel. A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.
Spear, Thomas. “Neo-traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa.” Journal
of African History 44 (2003): 3–27.
Stenzler, Juergen. Deutsch-Ostafrika: Kriegs- und Friedensbilder. Berlin: Reimer, 1910.
Tripp, Aili Mari. Changing the Rules: The Politics of Liberalization and the Urban Informal Economy
in Tanzania. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
Tumbo-Masabo, Zubeida and Rita Liljestroem. Chelewa Chelewa: The Dilemmas of Teenage Girls.
Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1994.
Vail, Leroy, ed. The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1991.
Vansina, Jan. Paths in the Rainforest: Toward a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992.
Vaughn Hassett, Donald. “Economic Organisation and Political Change in a Village of South East
Tanzania.” Unpublished PhD thesis, Cambridge University, 1984.
Velten, Carl. Sitten und Gebraeuche der Suaheli. Goettingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1903.
Wemba-Rashid, J. A. R. “Is Culture in Southeastern Tanzania Development-Unfriendly?” In The
Making of a Periphery: Economic Development and Cultural Encounters in Southern Tanzania,
edited by Berta Koda, and Pekka Seppaelae, 39–57. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1998.
Westerlund, David. Ujamaa na dini: A Study of Some Aspects of Society and Religion in Tanzania.
Stockholm: Almkvist and Wiksell, 1980.
JOURNAL OF EASTERN AFRICAN STUDIES 163
